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Abstract
In this paper, we step back from the literature on "environmental Kuznets
curves" (inverted-U relationships at the aggregate level between various indicators
of environmental degradation and per-capita income) to consider one possible com-
ponent of such relationships, i.e. the link between household income and household
choices that impact upon the environment. Our approach is distinguished by explicit
modeling of a household-level mechanism linking income to changes in environmen-
tal quality. Two facts are emphasized: (1) a household can not directly purchase
environmental quality; and (2) a household starts with a positive endowment of envi-
ronmental quality, which is degraded through consumption. We propose a household
production model, in which households purchase marketed commodities that bundle
a "good", non-environmental services, with a "bad", environmental degradation. We
show that even if the environment is a normal good, household substitution towards
less environmentally degrading marketed commodities, combined with natural con-
straints on the household's shifts between marketed commodities, could produce a
non-monotonic relationship between household income and environmental quality,
i.e. a non-monotonic environmental Engel curve.
Keywords: environment, household production, Engel curve, bundling
1. Introduction
A number of recent papers using aggregate cross-country data have suggested the
existence of an inverted-U relationship, at the aggregate level, between various in-
dicators of environmental degradation (e.g., air or water pollution) and per-capita
income.1 This finding—termed the environmental Kuznets curve—suggests that
while economic growth may initially be associated with degradation of the environ-
ment, continued growth may reverse any initial adverse effects.
An existing literature in the neoclassical growth tradition provides one way of
thinking about pollution and growth; it makes use of a representative agent frame-
work to explore optimal intertemporal tradeoffs between current consumption, in-
vestment in capital, and pollution control.2 A good example is Gruver (1976), which
extends the standard neoclassical growth model by incorporating the portfolio choice
between investments in productive capital and pollution-control capital. A key re-
sult is that under certain parameter configurations it is possible for the optimal
growth path to be unbalanced. The emphasis in the initial stages of growth is on
the accumulation of productive capital, which implies increasing levels of output
and pollution, but once a target stock of productive capital is reached, savings are
shifted towards pollution-control capital, leading to reductions in pollution. Such
analysis is certainly suggestive. However, the use of the representative agent frame-
work provides neither political economic nor other mechanisms through which the
environmental effects of economic growth might in fact be reversed.
The mechanisms underlying the aggregate relationship between growth and the
environment, though, can be relatively complex. For instance, even if all house-
holds value the environment, given externalities it is not clear how such preferences
would be aggregated to produce pollution control policies that diminish environmen-
tal impacts. Also, the mechanisms explaining aggregate relationships may involve
economy-wide shifts in consumption, such as differential growth rates among eco-
nomic sectors during development. Finally, these mechanisms might also involve
trade. For instance, as a country grows richer it might cease to produce goods
featuring "dirty" production processes, and simply import the finished goods.3
We step back from these complications to consider one building block of such ag-
gregate relationships, i.e. the way that households will change their environmental
quality, in response to changes in household income, when they have a high degree of
control over that quality. Once we have better understood the household dynamic,
we can add complications. Regarding the household problem, the role of prefer-
ences (be those of the social planner or of the household) is suggested by previous
work.4 In this paper, given a standard utility function, we emphasize a particular
household mechanism that allows for the possibility of non-monotonic environmen-
tal Engel curves. We emphasize two facts: (1) a household can not directly purchase
environmental quality; and (2) a household starts with a positive endowment of en-
vironmental quality, which is degraded through consumption. In light of these facts,
^ .g . , Grossman & Krueger (1995), Selden & Song (1994), Shank (1994), World Bank (1992).
2See, for instance, Plourde (1972), Keeler et al. (1972), D'Arge and Kogiku (1973), Forster
(1973), Gruver (1976), Stevens (1976), Asako (1980), Becker (1982), Tahvonen and Kuuluvainen
(1993), Selden & Song (1995) and Stokey (1998).
3Effects of trade have been discussed by, among others, Saint-Paul (1995) and Jaeger (1998).
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 For example, Lopez (1994) and Selden and Song (1995).
we propose a household production model, in which households purchase marketed
commodities that bundle, i.e., jointly produce, a "good", non-environmental services
valued by households, with a "bad", environmental degradation.5
We expect environmental services to be valued, and to be normal or perhaps
even luxury goods. But that implies that the Engel curves for environmental ser-
vices ought to be positively sloped at all incomes. The basic contribution of this
paper is to show that even when households value environmental services, the possi-
bility of a non-monotonic relationship between household income and environmental
quality arises quite naturally given the two facts just emphasized.6 In addition to the
environment being degraded from a positive endowment, the crucial issue is a house-
hold's ability to "purchase" environment by substituting among a range of marketed
commodities that represent different bundles of non-environmental services valued
by the household and degradation of the environment.
If both such non-environmental services and the environment are normal goods,
increases in income will produce two changes with opposing effects on the envi-
ronment: first, an increased demand for non-environmental services, and thus an
increased use of environmentally-degrading marketed commodities to produce ser-
vices; and second, a shift towards more environmentally-friendly (but more expen-
sive) commodities. The interaction of these two effects creates the possibility of
a U-shaped, or more generally a non-monotonic relationship between household
income and the level of environmental quality that the household enjoys. For in-
stance, we show that natural constraints on the household's choices of marketed
commodities generate two regimes (or ranges of incomes) in which the second effect
is non-existent. When these are preceded or followed by ranges of incomes in which
the second effect exists and dominates, a non-monotonic relationship will result.
Such consideration of the household-level, pollution-income relationship has value
for positive work on the aggregate relationship, in that it suggests hypotheses from
whose testing we can learn about underlying mechanisms. For instance, follow-
ing this theoretical analysis, we might empirically examine how households in fact
change environmental quality as income rises (when they can affect that quality),
in order to learn something of relevance to how more complex choices of national
pollution policies change as GNP rises. Also, our discussion of substitution suggests
the testable prediction that after most consumption is being derived from the clean-
est marketed commodities, further increases in income must lower environmental
quality unless further substitution is made possible through innovation.
The remainder of the paper is as follows. Section 2 outlines a simple household-
production framework, and then describes in some detail how a non-monotonic
Engel curve for environmental quality might arise within this framework, even when
environmental quality would be a normal good if it could be directly purchased.
Section 3 concludes with a brief discussion and implications for further research.
5
 Classic early references in the household production literature include Gorman (1980), Becker
(1965), Lancaster (1966a, 1966b).
6There is, though, no reason why such the household-level relationship between income and
environmental quality has to resemble an inverted-U. It might take on any number of shapes,
including a monotic rise in quality. This indeterminacy turns out to be an attractive positive
property. Despite the attention given to evidence of an inverted-U relationship, a more robust
finding is that the relationship is potentially non-monotonic, and in some situations there does not
appear to be any significant relationship at all.
2. Household production &; non-monotonic environmental Engel curves
2.1. Household production model
We begin with the observation that many environmental services cannot be directly
purchased. Rather, households start with endowments of environmental ameni-
ties, which are degraded through the consumption of marketed commodities. For
instance, in many poor, developing economies, the use of marketed fuels such as fire-
wood or kerosene results in the joint production of services that households value
(e.g., heat) and reductions in indoor air quality. We formalize this observation
within a household production/characteristics framework. We then show that even
when households value environmental amenities—and the demand for the ameni-
ties would be normal if they could be directly purchased—a U-shaped relationship
between household income and the environment can arise precisely because the en-
vironmental amenity cannot be directly purchased and is degraded. We use the
simplest possible model to demonstrate this and to develop the basic intuitions.
Let s denote a household's consumption of a generic non-environmental service,
and let a denote the level of the environmental amenity enjoyed by the household.
The critical assumption we make is that s and a cannot be directly purchased and
are, instead, jointly produced (in the case of a, degraded) through the use of the
marketed inputs. Consider a situation where households have a choice between two
marketed inputs, a "dirty" (more environmentally destructive) input d and a "clean"
input c. Assuming that s is generated linearly from the use of these inputs, we can,
without further loss of generality, redefine the units in which the two inputs are
measured so that the total volume of valued services s is given by:
s(q)=qd + qc (2.1)
where qj and qc are the quantities used of the dirty and clean inputs respectively.
Without losing any of the basic intuitions, we can also assume that the degradation
of the environmental amenity a is fully linear in the inputs. For instance, we will
assume both that the total emissions level e is linear in the inputs:
Pqc (2.2)
where a > (5 > 0, and that the environmental amenity is linear in total emissions:
a(e) = A-e (2.3)
The household's problem is to choose marketed inputs q to maximize:
U(s,a) (2.4)
subject to:
Pdqd+Pcqc = y (2.5)
where y is household income and pd and pc are, respectively, the per-unit (of services)
prices of the dirty and clean inputs (we also assume that pa < pc).7
7
 Certainly this could be more general, with J different marketed goods available to the house-
In this two-input case, it is instructive to recast the problem as a household
choice of the level of services s and of how those services are produced. Let:
7T = -^— (2.6)
be the share of the clean input in the overall service consumption of the household.
The s(q), a(q) technologies then imply a function a(s,?r) such that:
as = - ^ < 0 and a^ = - ^ > 0 (2.7)
ds dir
In other words, holding constant the share of clean inputs, increased service con-
sumption leads to a deterioration in environmental quality, and holding constant
overall services, switching to the clean input improves environmental quality.
Households choose s and TT to maximize:
U(s,a(s,7r)) (2.8)
subject to:
pd(l -7r)s+pc7rs = y (2.9)
0<?r < 1
We assume that [/(.) is increasing and concave in both arguments, and that prefer-
ences are such that the demands for s and a would be normal were households able
to directly purchase them.8 With these assumptions, it is straightforward to show
that the household's optimal choices of both s and TT will be weakly increasing in
y, household income. That immediately raises the possibility that the relationship
between household income and environmental quality may be non-monotonic, since:
da(s(y)My))=da ds da dn(y)
ay os ay oiv ay
For example, it could be that the demand for services s would rise rapidly from
lower to middle incomes and then flatten, while that for "being cleaner", i.e. for TT,
hold, qj signifying the consumption of marketed good j , and household production technologies:
s = s(qi,...,qj, ...,qj) with — — > 0
ah = a(qi,...,qj,...,qj) with —-j j - < 0
While all inputs produce services but lower environmental quality, we assume that different inputs
may bundle services and reductions in environmental quality in different ways. Thus, the partial
derivatives, -Q^- and ^ - will, in general, differ across the inputs j = 1,..., J. The household's
problem is to choose (qi, ...,qj, ...,qj) to maximize its utility subject to a budget constraint.
8Specifically, we assume that:
UaUsa - UsUaa > 0
UsUsa ~ UaUss > 0
where we use the notation Fx to represent the partial derivative of a function F(.) with respect to
the argument x. Note also that for the particular a(s,ir) function implied here, ass = 0, a^-n — 0,
and aS7r > 0, which given linear e(q) makes the problem well-defined.
would rise only at higher levels of household income. This could produce a U-shaped
Engel curve.9 The intuition here is that the ability to substitute between marketed
goods allows a separation of two decisions: how much service to consume, and how
to produce that service. The fact that these two decisions may move independently
with respect to income allows for their combined effect to be non-monotonic.
2.2. Graphical analysis
Additional intuition is most easily developed diagrammatically. Consider Figure
1. The household's initial endowment point is at the upper left corner, where the
household enjoys a base level of the environmental amenity but no services. Again,
this asymmetric starting point is crucial; it implies that at low levels of income,
the marginal utility of additional services is likely to be relatively high compared
to that of additional units of the environmental amenity.10 The dashed rays orig-
inating from this point depict a(s,0) and a(s,l), i.e., the combinations of a and s
attainable through exclusive use of one or the other of the inputs. The solid lines
connecting a(s, 0) and a(s, 1) represent the household's budget constraints at dif-
ferent levels of income. Increasing income is reflected in budget constraints further
from the endowment point. The slopes of the budget constraints indicate the relative
shadow prices of the non-marketed goods, environmental quality and services—i.e.,
the slopes indicate the rate at which, given the underlying technologies and the
prices of the marketed inputs, households are able to trade off between environmen-
tal quality and other valued services. The negative slope of the budget constraints
reflects our assumption that dirtier inputs are cheaper than cleaner inputs (per unit
of service produced). The shape of the indifference curves comes from the concavity
of U(.) and the fact that both a and s enter positively into the household's utility.
Indifference curves further up and to the right reflect higher levels of utility.
2.2.1. Limits on substitution
Figure 1 shows the optimal consumption points of the household at six different levels
of income. The increases in income that lead to the shifts from point A to point C,
as well as those which cause the shifts from point D to point F, are accompanied
by a deterioration in environmental quality. The subset of transitions from point A
to point D, however, together trace out a U-shaped relationship between y and a.
This is because in the transition from point C to point D, the increase in income
brings with it an improvement in environmental quality. The intuition behind the
9For a more general but perhaps less illustrative intuition, ignore for the moment the fact that the
input demand functions may not be differentiable at all incomes because of binding non-negativity
constraints on input use, and represent the slope of the Engel curve linking a to y as:
The key point to note here is that the demand for the marketed inputs is derived from the house-
hold's preferences for s and a. Thus, there can be no presumption that the demand for a marketed
good will be normal. In fact, within a characteristics/household production framework, inferior
marketed goods can be quite common (Deaton and Muellbauer (1980), Lipsey and Rosenbluth
(1971)). If, therefore, dirty inputs are inferior (after a certain income) while clean inputs are
normal, it is quite possible that the Engel curve for the environmental amenity will be U-shaped.
10Stokey (1998) also notes within a static model the importance of such marginal utility ratios.
latter transition is relatively straightforward. Households value both a and s. The
possibility of input substitution, by providing households with the added degree of
flexibility to choose both s—i.e., "how much of the service to consume"—as well as
TV—i.e., "how to produce that level of service"—allows them to increase both s and
a by switching to increased use of the clean input.
The other four transitions, in which a rise in income is accompanied by a decline
in environmental quality, demonstrate the importance of natural constraints on the
household's choice of marketed inputs. These result from what we call a lack of
substitution possibilities, or binding non-negativity constraints on input use, given
the existence of both a "dirtiest" input and a "cleanest" (but still environmentally
degrading) input. At a relatively low income level, such as at the lowest budget
constraint shown in the figure, the utility-maximizing point A involves use of only
dirty inputs. That is not surprising given that the household begins with a positive
endowment of the environmental amenity but no services. Increases in income shift
out the budget constraint, but initially lead the household to only move along the
dirty inputs locus to a point such as B. Thus, increasing incomes from a relatively
low base leads to more services but lower environmental quality.
Perhaps slightly more surprising is that even when the household is willing to
pay for some environmental quality, i.e. starts to use the clean input, increased
income might again lead to more services but lower environmental quality. This is
shown in the shift from B to C. What this transition highlights is the fact that at B,
the household is, in a sense, constrained by the lack of a cheaper, dirtier input - at
the same income, had a cheaper, dirtier input been available, the household could
have chosen a point such as B'. Note also that the household's preferences are such
that, had the household not been constrained by the lack of substitution possibilities
at B, demand for environmental quality would have increased with income in the
shift to C. The transition from D to E is analogous to that from B to C, although
in this case the household is constrained by the lack of a more expensive, cleaner
input - at the same income, had such an input been available, the household could
have chosen a point such as E'. Finally, after the household has fully substituted to
the clean input, further increases in income will inevitably lead to reductions in the
environmental amenity level, as in the transition from E to F.
2.2.2. Shifts in relative shadow price
Figure 2 introduces a third marketed input, which we call a "transitional input",
and depicts optimal consumption points at four levels of income. As in the shift
from C to D in Figure 1, the shift from A to B here involves an increase in the
environmental normal good. The two transitions from point B to point D, however,
trace out a U-shaped relationship between y and a. This demonstrates the potential
importance of shifts in the relative shadow prices of the goods that the household
values. In this linear characteristics case, the relative shadow price of environmental
quality with respect to services remains the same, at all levels of usage, as long as
the household uses the same pair of inputs. Thus, an increase in income that does
not result in the household changing its mix of inputs has to be associated (if the
demand for a is normal) with an improvement in environmental quality, as in the
shifts from A to B and C to D. However, if an additional increase in income leads
the household to shift inputs, i.e. to use a different pair out of the three inputs,
the relative price of s and a will change, and in particular the relative price of
environmental quality will rise. As in the move from B to C, this can result in the
household choosing a reduced level of environmental quality if the substitution effect
from this relative price change outweighs the direct income effect.11
That the environment is degraded from a positive endowment matters even for
this substitution effect. The possibility of relative shadow prices of non-marketed
goods shifting with increases in income is a feature of all household-production mod-
els. However, only when marketed goods bundle a "good" with a "bad" could the
substitution effect of the relative price shift accompanying an increase in income out-
weigh the direct effect of income. Consider Figure 4, where marketed inputs, such
as foods, bundle only characteristics valued by the household, such as nutrients.
Starting from point A, if we move to a higher budget vertically (holding nutrient 1
constant), the relative price of nutrient 1 is necessarily equal to that at A (or lower,
for even larger budgets). Similarly, if we move horizontally (holding nutrient 2 con-
stant), the relative price of nutrient 2 is necessarily lower than that at A. Therefore,
as long as household preferences are such that the demand for each nutrient is nor-
mal, an increase in income cannot lead to a decrease in the consumption of any
nutrient. Only in the rare case that a nutrient is a Giffen good will an increase in
income be associated with a decrease in the consumption of that nutrient.12 The
difference between this standard linear characteristics case and our Figure 2 is high-
lighted when preferences are homothetic. In the standard case, a household with
homothetic preferences will never change its mix of inputs (or the relative shadow
price faced) as its income rises. In contrast, as Figure 2 indicates, when marketed
commodities bundle a good with a bad, even with homothetic preferences a house-
hold that is using the "dirtiest" input must eventually change its mix of inputs, and
thus the relative shadow price of the environmental amenity must eventually rise.
11
 Figure 3 suggests that even within shifts between mixes of the same two inputs, a shift in the
relative shadow price can occur if a(s,n) is non-linear (i.e., if e(q), a(e) or both is non-linear). In
the general non-linear case, to ensure that the household's problem is well-defined, i.e. that the
budget constraints are concave as depicted, we make the following assumptions about a(s,n):





The first three assumptions seem quite natural: the marginal damage to the environment from
the use of marketed inputs remains constant or rises with the total level of use; the marginal
improvement in environmental quality from switching to the cleaner input remains constant or
declines as the share of the clean input rises; and the marginal improvement from switching to the
cleaner input does not fall with the total level of use. The fourth assumption is less intuitive, but is
satisfied in the leading case in which e(q) is linear, as above, and a(e) is non-linear (in which case
aee < 0, analogous to ass < 0, replaces the first three conditions above).
A non-linear a(e) technology implies that the relative shadow prices of s and a change along the
budget constraint. In principle, it is possible, as in the shift from C to D in Figure 3, that holding
constant the level of environmental quality, an increase in the level of services is only possible at a
higher relative price of environmental quality. It is worth noting, however, that for many leading
non-linear a(e) technologies, this sort of change in relative shadow price is not in fact possible.
12
 That it is rare for a nutrient (or any non-marketed characteristic valued by households) to be
a Giffen good should not be confused with our earlier assertion that within a household production
framework, inferior or Giffen goods can be quite common among marketed commodities.
2.3. Conditions for non-monotonicity
As is implicit in (2.10) and (2.11), when an environmental amenity can not be di-
rectly purchased and is degraded from a positive endowment, any number of income-
environment relationships can emerge. A subset of these household environmental
Engel curves will be non-monotonic, and a subset of the non-monotonic curves are
U-shaped. This indeterminacy is a positive feature of any building block of an ag-
gregate income-environment relationship, as not only non-monotonic and U-shaped
but also non-monotonic but non-U-shaped relationships, as well as both monotonic
and insignificant relationships have been suggested within the set of aggregate em-
pirical studies. Here we present a few basic conditions for non-monotonicity of
environmental Engel curves which follow from the crucial elements of our model.
The dominant condition for non-monotonicity is that a range of incomes in
which the household can substitute towards less degrading inputs as income rises is
preceded or followed by a range of incomes in which it can not. When substitution
is possible, the ability to separate the choice of how much s to consume from that
of how to produce s using different marketed goods allows the household to increase
not only the normal good s but also the normal good a in response to increases
in income. A lack of substitution, though, eliminates the ^ term in (2.10), which
guarantees that the environmental endowment will be further degraded by additional
consumption of s in response to increases in income.
Two leading cases stand out. First, if the household uses only the dirtiest input
for the lowest incomes, but then substitutes at higher incomes, its environmental En-
gel curve will be non-monotonic, with a U-shaped portion. Second, if the household
uses only the cleanest input for the highest incomes, but for lower incomes shifts its
mix of dirtier and cleaner inputs (for a given pair of inputs or shifting across pairs)
such that a rises with income (monotonically or allowing for dips from changes in
relative shadow prices), its environmental Engel curve will again be non-monotonic.
However, in this case the amenity level would first rise and then fall with increases
in income, a curvature inverse to that for the lower-income household. Putting
these non-monotonic segments together over the full range of incomes, a pattern
of no substitution, then substitution, and then again no substitution suggests that
the environment will fall, then rise and then fall again as income rises, yielding an
"inverted N"-shaped environmental Engel curve.
The other principal condition for non-monotonicity is that over some range of
incomes the substitution effect of a rise in the relative shadow price of a, which acts
to lower a, outweighs the direct income effect, which raises the consumption of this
normal good. This effect, like a lack of substitution possibilities, reduces the ^L
term in (2.10), so that the # term may dominate. If so, a will fall with income
across this range, yielding non-monotonicity when preceding or subsequent ranges
of incomes feature substitution between inputs such that a rises with income.
The leading case is that the environmental amenity a will fall with income given
the rise in the relative shadow price of a that results from a shift between pairs
of marketed inputs, while preceding and subsequent income ranges feature shifts
within a pair of inputs. In the linear characteristics case, any such sequence (e.g.,
from A to D in Figure 2) must produce a non-monotonic segment of the household
environmental Engel curve. Note in particular that from B to C in Figure 2, over a
range of incomes the increase in the relative shadow price of a leads the household
to use only the transitional input, such that ^ equals zero.
3. Conclusion
Theoretical explanations for the "environmental Kuznets curves" suggested within a
growing empirical literature have usually been framed within optimal growth models
extended to incorporate abatement or investment in pollution control. By stepping
back to the household level, and thus away from many complicating factors, this
paper has provided a complementary perspective on aggregate pollution-income rela-
tionships. Our approach is distinguished by explicit modeling of a specific household-
level mechanism in a situation in which the household can control environmental
quality—i.e., input substitution within a household production framework in which
marketed inputs bundle valued services with environmental degradation. We showed
that the facts that the environment is degraded from an endowmnent, and that it
can not be directly purchased but instead is "purchased" through household shifts
to marketed goods which are less environmentally degrading, raise the possibility of
a non-monotonic environmental Engel curve at the household level.
Such consideration of the household-level, pollution-income relationship has value
for positive work on the aggregate relationship, in that it suggests hypotheses from
whose testing we can learn about underlying mechanisms. For instance, along these
lines Chaudhuri and Pfaff (1997) examine Pakistani households' shifts between fuels
as household income rises, to get a sense for how households are in fact making the
sorts of tradeoffs described above regarding indoor air quality. Also, our focus on
substitution leads to the testable household-level prediction that after most output
is produced using the cleanest techniques, further increases in income will lower en-
vironmental quality (yielding an "N-shaped" overall relationship between pollution
and income if this occurence follows an inverse-U shaped segment).
Further, once the household problem and its implications are better understood,
we can start to add back the complications that arise when many agents inter-
act to produce the environmental outcome. For instance, our household produc-
tion framework suggests the possibility of endogenously increasing (environmental)
product variety and quality during the process of income growth. With incomes
rising, as more households are willing to substitute towards cleaner and potentially
more expensive inputs, firms should be more willing to provide newer, cleaner in-
puts. To our knowledge, this has not been explored, and we plan to pursue this in
future research. In addition, with respect to pollution policies, representative agent-
based optimal growth models necessarily assume away free-rider problems and other
household-level externalities that may be important in practice. In contrast, while
in this paper we have not emphasized the common property characteristics of many
environmental amenities, nor performed the explicit aggregation that would provide
a direct link between our household-level analysis and aggregate phenomena, the
framework presented here provides the building blocks for a more explicit treatment
of aggregation and free-rider issues. For instance, within politico-economic models
that emphasize a regulatory channel through which an environmental Kuznets curve
might come about, our framework should permit a more detailed characterization
of why and how voting behavior might change with income.
References
[1] Asako, K. (1980). "Economic Growth and Environmental Pollution under the
Max-Min Principle". Journal of Environmental Economics and Management
7:157-183.
[2] Becker, G. (1965), "A theory of the allocation of time," Economic Journal, Vol.
75, pp.493-517.
[3] Becker, R.A. (1982). "Intergenerational Equity: The Capital-Environment
Trade-Off". Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 9:165-185.
[4] Chaudhuri, S. and A.S.P. Pfaff (1997), "Household income, fuel choice and
indoor air quality: an empirical analysis," mimeo, Department of Economics,
Columbia University.
[5] D'Arge, R.C. and K.C. Kogiku (1973), "Economic growth and the environ-
ment," Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 40, pp. 61-77.
[6] Deaton, A. and J. Muelbauer (1980). Economics and Consumer Behavior, Cam-
bridge University Press, Cambridge.
[7] Forster, B.A. (1973), "Optimal capital accumulation in a polluted environ-
ment," Southern Economic Journal, Vol. 39, pp.544-547.
[8] Gorman, W.M. (reprinted 1980), "A possible procedure for analysing quality
differentials in the egg market," Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 47.
[9] Grossman, G. and A. Krueger (1995), "Economic Growth and the Environ-
ment," Quarterly Journal of Economics, May.
[10] Gruver, G.W. (1976), "Optimal investment in pollution control in a neoclassical
growth context," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Vol.
3, pp.165-177.
[11] Hilton, F. G. H. and A. Levinson (1998), "Factoring the environmental Kuznets
curve: evidence from automotive lead emissions," Journal of Environmental
Economics and Management, Vol. 35, No. 2 (March).
[12] Jaeger, William K. (1998). "Growth and Environmental Resources: A Theo-
retical Basis for the U-shaped Path", mimeo 10/14/98, Williams College, and
presentation at an AERE/ASSA session, New York, January 1999.
[13] Kahn, M.E.(1998), "A Household Level Environmental Kuznets Curve," Eco-
nomics Letters
[14] Keeler, E., M. Spence and R. Zeckhauser (1972), "The optimal control of pol-
lution," Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 4, pp.19-34.
[15] Kuznets, S. (1955). "Economic growth and income inequality," American Eco-
nomic Review, Vol. 65, pp. 1-28.
[16] Lancaster, K.J. (1966a), "A new approach to consumer theory," Journal of
Political Economy, Vol. 74, pp. 132-157.
10
[17] (1966b), "Change and innovation in the technology of consump-
tion," American Economic Review, Vol. 56, pp. 14-23.
[18] Lopez, Ramon (1994). "The Environment as a Factor of Production: The Ef-
fects of Economic Growth and Trade Liberalization". Journal of Environmental
Economics and Management 27:163-184.
[19] Lipsey, R.G. and G. Rosenbluth (1971), "A contribution to the new theory of
demand: a rehabilitation of the Giffen good," Canadian Journal of Economics,
Vol. 4, pp. 131-163.
[20] Plourde, C.G. (1972). "A Model of Waste Accumulation and Disposal". Cana-
dian Journal of Economics 5(1):119-125.
[21] Saint-Paul, G. (1995). "Discussion", in Goldin, Ian and L. Alan Winters, eds.,
The Economics of Sustainable Development. Cambridge University Press for
the OECD and Centre for Economic Policy Research, pp.47-50.
[22] Seldon and Song (1995), "Neoclassical growth, the J curve for abatement and
the inverted U curve for pollution," Journal of Environmental Economics and
Management, 29(2), pp. 162-168.
[23] Seldon and Song (1994), "Environmental quality and development: is there
a U for air pollution emissions?," Journal of Environmental Economics and
Management, 27(2): 147-162.
[24] Shank, N. (1994). "Economic development and environmental quality: an
econometric analysis," Oxford Economic Papers, v.46.
[25] Smith, Kerry (1991). "Household Production Functions and Environmental
Benefit Estimation", in J. Braden and C Kolstad. Measuring the demand for
environmental quality. North-Holland.
[26] Stephens, J.K. (1976). "A Relatively Optimistic Analysis of Growth and Pollu-
tion in a Neoclassical Framework". Journal of Environmental Economics and
Management 3:85-96.
[27] Stokey, Nancy L. (1998). "Are There Limits to Growth?". International Eco-
nomic Review 39(1):1-31.
[28] Tahvonen, O. and J. Kuuluvainen (1993). "Economic Growth, Pollution, and
Renewable Resources". Journal of Environmental Economics and Management
24:101-118.
[29] World Bank (1992). World Development Report 1992: Development and the



























1998-1999 Discussion Paper Series
Department of Economics
Columbia University
1022 International Affairs Bldg.
420 West 118th Street
New York, N.Y., 10027
The following papers are published in the 1998-99 Columbia University Discussion Paper series
which runs from early November to October 31 of the following year (Academic Year).
The following is the Columbia University, Economics Department's website where viewers may
access more information about the Discussion Paper series.
Http://www.columbia.edu/cu/economics/
All 1997-98,1998-99 and future papers will be acessible on-line at the following website:
Http ://www.ssrn.com
Discussions papers that are not available on-line maybe obtained by written request to the
Economics Department. Please check the Ordering Papers section for details.
Copy Requests
To order 1996-97 and prior discussion papers, please write to the Discussion Paper Coordinator
at the address below, along with a check for the appropriate amount, made payable to:
Department of Economics, Columbia University. Please be sure to indicate the discussion paper
number or the particular series in your written request. Orders cannot be processed without
payment, and they cannot be taken over the phone, or by fax or email.
Past discussion papers (1996-97 and prior papers) are available for purchase in
U.S. dollars only, at the cost of:
US: per paper $4.00 / per series: $140.00
Canada: per paper $5.00 / per series: $150.00
Overseas: per paper $7.00 / per series $185.00
1998-99 Discussion Papers









II 111111111115111551 jSflBSfiffirffffm H 11(1 li 1 III Bfi!lBliliiFffffPfflM'*'»"*«**S *I^B^^^^^^^»niPPnnHlllll 'HHPP*' JTRwH^WBIwlrllilSHHHlll!!! n n l fflllH HlilllililinlrWffSTmHnnirTlPy 1' III' 11W11 fflffffff
Propensity Score Matching Methods for Non-experimental Causal Studies
Institutional Solutions to the Principal-Agent Problem in African Health Care
The Economics of Repeated Extortion
To Pay or Not to Pay: Managerial Decision making and Wage Withholding in Russia
Wage Arrears, Poverty, and Family Survival Strategies in Russia
Averaged Periodogram Spectral Estimation with Long Memory Conditional
Heteroscedasticity
Household Production, the Bundling of Services and Degradation, and Non-
monotonic Environmental Engel Curves
•HH
Dehejia, R.
Leonard, K.
Leonard, D.
Choi, J.P.
Thum, M.
Desai, P.
Idson, T.
Desai, P.
Idson, T.
Henry, M.
Chaudhuri, S.
Pfaff, A.
Page 1
